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3 It’s about More Water. Natural Resource Conflicts 
in Central Asia 
Christine Bichsel8 
 
3.1 Introduction 
A body of academic and policy-oriented literature began to focus on the danger of conflict in Central 
Asia as of the late 1990s. While differing in details, the authors concurred that the Ferghana Valley 
has a high potential for violent conflict. They base this potential on evidence of past violent episodes 
and/or present tensions that may yield in violence. In other words, these writings depict the 
Ferghana Valley as a ‘host of crises’ (Slim 2002) or a ‘flashpoint of conflict’ (Tabyshalieva 1999:vii). 
The literature argues in general lines that the potential for conflict is constituted by a broad array of 
interlinked conflictive factors, including social, political, economic, religious, demographic, military, 
and criminal ones. A core concern of this literature is inter-ethnic conflict over natural resources, 
aptly summarised by Slim (2002:511): ‘In the short term, they [aid agencies] must focus on the 
localities where water-based conflicts have taken on an ethnic character and which, if not 
addressed, might provide the spark for region-wide interethnic violence’. This literature on conflict in 
the Ferghana Valley stressed the need for interventions by international aid to avert widespread 
violence resulting form this potential. 
This concern was taken up by several donor organisations in early 2000, including the three aid 
agencies on which this article focuses. First, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
(SDC) is a governmental donor organisation which coordinates international development activities 
of Switzerland as a part of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Second, Mercy Corps International 
(Mercy Corps) is an international NGO which acts in this case as an implementing agency for the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Third, the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) is a multilateral aid agency and represents the UN’s global development 
network in Central Asia. While these three agencies have implemented a multitude of projects in 
Central Asia, for this article I base my insights on three only. With regard to SDC, this is the 
‘Regional Dialogue and Development’ (RDD) project active over the period 2002-2005 in Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. In the case of Mercy Corps, I look into the ‘Peaceful Communities 
Initiative’ (PCI) implemented in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and later also Tajikistan during 2001–
2006. For UNDP, I focus on the ‘Preventive Development Component’ (PDC) and later ‘Preventive 
Development Programme’ (PDP) conducted over the period 2000-2005 mainly in southern 
Kyrgyzstan, but at a later stage also in northern Tajikistan. My main argument is that the three 
projects rest on a misconceived interpretation of the conflicts upon which they were devised to act. 
Because they see conflict as an endemic element in village life and because their perspective is 
strongly influenced by a functional interpretation of the issue of scarcity, aid agencies in this context 
fail to take into account the political dimension of social change, and do not pay enough attention to 
the issue of power in natural resource conflict management. 
3.2 Engaging with conflict at the village level 
With these three projects, SDC, UNDP and Mercy Corps aimed to mitigate conflicts over water and 
land between rural communities differing in ethnic affiliation. The three aid agencies largely 
subscribed to a similar approach, although it varied in detail, implementation, and the weight  given  
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to singular components. It centred on the combination of the following three components: (1) 
building or rehabilitating infrastructure; (2) establishing and training community-based organisations 
(CBOs); (3) fostering joint social activities between the adversarial groups. The first component 
entails the building and rehabilitation of drinking water and irrigation infrastructure, but also 
healthcare, educational and recreational facilities. It should help communities at loggerheads to 
resolve the structural causes of conflict, related to the scarcity of natural resources and to the 
dysfunctional state of infrastructure. The second component consists in establishing and training 
CBOs for each conflict party. By means of CBOs, communities should be enabled to mobilise and 
constructively address the conflict at stake, turning it into a more peaceful relationship. The third 
component involves fostering joint social activities between the adversarial groups. It entails the 
creation of social spaces for conflict parties or parts of them to interact, such as youth clubs, sports 
competition or festivals. Cultivating communication, trust and personal friendship is expected to 
improve inter-group relations. 
SDC, UNDP and Mercy Corps implemented this approach numerous times in the Ferghana Valley. In 
most cases, the social unit for implementation included two or several village sharing an irrigation 
system, within which conflictive claims over water and land had arisen. The three aid agencies thus 
conceptualised conflict as existing in a limited spatial extension expressed by the villages and their 
adjacent land, as well as in a confined scalar dimension in that its roots were seen as residing only in 
the relationships between the conflict parties. In my exploration, I follow this particular perspective 
adopted by the aid agencies and explore their approach based on three such cases in the Ferghana 
Valley. The first case focuses on the three villages of Pülgön, Khalmion and Alga in Kyrgyzstan. The 
three villages share a large irrigation system on the border of Uzbekistan. While in particular 
Khalmion is likely to have a very long history of irrigated agriculture, the main canal infrastructure 
now in place was built during the 1970s. With independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the 
overall share of water available for the irrigation system became dependent on inter-governmental 
agreements between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Disputes over irrigation water are a frequent 
occurrence in this irrigation system. They have occurred and do occur between upstream and 
downstream users, and also between Kyrgyz and Uzbek populations in this area. Yet, so far, 
governmental agencies as well as water users have managed to successfully resolve these disputes. 
The second case centres on the three villages of Khush'iar in Uzbekistan, and Sogment and Charbak 
in Kyrgyzstan. They came into public attention with a violent escalation of the conflict in spring 
2005. The three villages share a complicated cross-border irrigation system whose main canal dates 
back to the period of the Second World War. The system was enlarged with additional pumps and 
canals during the 1970s in order to satisfy the growing need for water. Rather than for the 
considerable amounts of water transported by the main canal, disputes occur over water distribution 
from a small spring. These disputes have been framed by analyses in terms of animosities between 
Kyrgyz and Tajiks which inhabit the three villages. Mercy Corps has addressed these disputes during 
2002-2003. The third case entails the two villages of Aksai in Kyrgyzstan and Tojikon in Tajikistan. It 
is, compared with the two cases described above, the most long-standing dispute over water and 
land. At the same time, the conflict resulted in the largest number of casualties over time. The 
infrastructure of the irrigation system in place was built between the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
However, disputes between Aksai and Tojikon date further back into the Soviet period and can be 
traced to the 1930s. The conflict is often explained in terms of long-standing inter-ethnic animosities 
between Kyrgyz and Tajiks. The dispute between Aksai and Tojikon has been addressed by two aid 
agencies in the focus of my research (see Bichsel 2009). In 2003-2004, SDC and UNDP attempted to 
resolve the conflict over irrigation water. 
A conceptual analysis of the aid agencies’ approach to conflicts over land and water shows that they 
are guided by three basic assumptions. First, SDC, UNDP and Mercy Corps assume that competition 
over limited water and land may divide communities along ethnic lines. They expect that economic 
deprivation and unsatisfied human needs lead people to resort to violence. The causal link between 
increasing  resource  scarcity  and  the  occurrence  of  inter-group  violence  follows  a  hypothesis in 
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environmental conflict or environmental security research on mainly intrastate conflict. During the 
1990s, several research projects established a causal relationship between the environment, scarcity 
and violence, however mediated by context factors (see for example Baechler 1998; Homer-Dixon 
1996, 1999). Thus, in the aid agencies’ approach, water and land scarcity becomes the explanatory 
factor linking irrigation and inter-group violence, resulting from mismanagement, socio-economic 
deterioration and demographic pressure. They attempted to remedy scarcity by means of improved 
infrastructure which should supply additional water. 
Second, SDC, UNDP and Mercy Corps state that violent conflict is a dysfunctional social condition 
and should be transformed into a peaceful state by non-violent means. For this, they subscribe to the 
concept of conflict transformation (Lederach 1995; Miall 2004; Mitchell 2002). Within this concept, 
they suggest that behavioural, relational and structural changes should bring about peace. In terms 
of behavioural changes, the aid agencies expect that the conflict parties need to adopt moderation, 
tolerance and affect control. Relational changes should be achieved through increased contact 
between the groups at loggerheads, therefore reducing prejudices and improving social relations 
between them. The three aid agencies foresee that joint social activities should bring about such 
change. Structural change, finally, should alter the very constitution of society which gives rise to or 
supports the continuation of conflict (Miall 2004:70).This faulty constitution is located in the socio-
political construction of the state. Civil society should therefore foster more democratic and peaceful 
governance. However, the aid agencies also attempt to tap on the local potential for peace in the 
form of traditional institutions (Lederach 1995). 
Third, the three aid agencies expect social change to happen with the emergence of specific forms of 
power. This idea is expressed most distinctly when they speak of the need for empowerment that, in 
their view, bears the potential for change. Such power should result from specific forms of social 
interaction which brings to life associational power. Through participatory procedures, the conflict 
parties should be empowered to exert collective action for the public good. The aid agencies locate 
such power to a high degree in individual members of a community. They expect power to increase 
with the successful pursuit of individual and collective goals, not conditional upon prior changes in 
structures and systems (Mohan and Stokke 2000:249). At the same time they expect that with the 
emergence of ‘civil society’, this power may exert pressure on autocratic and unresponsive states 
and thereby support the desired change towards a more democratic governance which should 
foreclose violence. The establishment of CBOs is central for such change. 
3.3 Scarcity as a social and political issue 
My empirical data, stemming from the three cases presented, provides insights for a critical 
discussion of the there basic assumptions outlined above. I have outlined the conceptualisation of 
the link between population growth, the environment and conflict that the aid agencies bring 
forward. They posited, as it has been suggested, that ‘grievances’ arising from ‘scarcity’ divide 
groups along ethnic lines and drive them to adopt violence. The empirical analysis showed that there 
were moments in all three cases when people apprehend water as scarce. Yet, as the detailed 
explorations of social relations within irrigation systems show, at closer sight the phenomenon 
defies easy definition and generalisation. First, the experience of ‘scarcity’ is not simply an overall 
characteristics of an irrigation system, but appears in temporally and spatially discrete instances. 
Second, ‘scarcity’ is far from being a merely natural condition. It results from local institutional 
contexts but is equally embedded in shifts of larger political and socio-economic networks over time. 
Third, the experience of ‘scarcity’ is not an objective dimension. The meaning that people attribute 
to it cannot be understood outside specific economic, political and cultural contexts. ‘Scarcity’ is thus 
socially as well as naturally constituted, and a result of complex human interaction (see also Barnett 
2000; Hartmann 2001; Timura 2001). 
For irrigation systems, socially constituted water scarcity is often attributed to human needs or 
greed.  In  this  view,  human  greed  leads to depriving  others of  their water, while through human 
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needs the phenomenon ‘scarcity’ comes into view. My research has shown that human agency in 
relation to water and meanings attributed to it are complex, and the practice of upgrading one’s 
water supply at the expense of others is not easily understood as greed that results in needs. On the 
one hand, such a practice may characterise human voraciousness, instructively pointed out by the 
following Kyrgyz saying, which states that ‘Even if one’s stomach is full, one’s eyes are still hungry’. 
On the other hand, the same practice may have its motivation in human foresight and precaution, 
when water is hoarded to provide for the ‘black day’, which is characterised by the inherent 
uncertainty about water provision in the system. The proximity of the two possible explanations - 
that may furthermore not be mutually exclusive - blurs the boundaries between needs and greed, 
and show furthermore the relativity of the two concepts. 
Moreover, it is important to ask to whom ‘needs’ and ‘greed’ is attributed. My research has shown 
that water distribution does not necessarily constitute or divide groups along ethnic or kinship lines, 
but is often rather based on residential or territorial collectivities. Yet, this distinction is at times 
obscured by the fact that residential and ethnic groups coincide. Furthermore, in the case of water, 
solidarity is contextual and temporal, and may not automatically arise as often presumed. In relation 
to this, it is important to note that dimensions of irrigation systems often include formal, ideological 
discourses of how it should work, descriptive accounts of how it actually works, and, again 
differently, the actual social practices that take place (see also Hunt and Hunt 1976:392). Therefore, 
monolithic representations of groups should not be taken for granted, neither in relation to water 
nor with regard to the very nature of kinship and ethnicity. The diffuse nature of ‘scarcity’ also 
questions universal forms of causalities proposed to arise from them. Experiences of ‘scarcity’ lead to 
numerous social responses that do not imply violence (Barnett 2000:283). At the same time, 
competition for water is a distinct reality during the irrigation season. Yet again, daily skirmishes 
and fights that arise from such competition should not be mistaken for inter-group violence, since 
the latter follows a different logic. The complexities of the conflict escalation show that such 
processes are essentially cultural and political work and entail much more than just a response to a 
state of a natural resource (Schröder and Schmidt 2001). Furthermore, the close scrutiny of 
interpretational and representational politics in the course of escalations forms renders the very idea 
of linear, unidirectional causality chains problematic. 
Yet causality should not easily be disbanded, as violence is often discussed as a symptom to find 
causes and cures (Feldman 1995:226). Explanations of violent events may not unearth actual 
causalities, but provide crucial insights into how people assert situations and how they attribute 
meanings to what happens. Moreover, they may express deeply held values at the core of the 
dispute. To illustrate this, I turn to the violent escalation that took place between Aksai and Tojikon 
in 1975. In an interview, an elder from Aksai remembered how residents of Tojikon began to extend 
the cultivation of land towards Aksai. As a consequence, a group of elders had repeatedly appealed 
to the authorities of the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) and equally to their Tajik neighbours 
to stop these activities. Yet, as my interlocutor suspected and other persons alleged, authorities of 
the Kyrgyz SSR had tacitly agreed to concede the respective piece of land with leaders from the Tajik 
SSR, and concluded a secret deal. Suspecting betrayal by their own authorities, as the elder 
explained, this was the moment when ‘the Kyrgyz became very angry and prepared for war’, 
perceived to be the only way to solve the problem by taking things into their own hands. Thus in this 
instance, it may not so much be the mere restriction of freedom and civil rights which gives rise to 
violence, but also the ultimate feeling of not being recognised and abandoned by the state. 
This observation touches upon the norms and values that construe the concept of conflict 
transformation. This prescriptive approach is underpinned by a number of normative choices. While 
it defines the dysfunctionality of a social condition, it equally projects a remedied situation through 
social change. Dysfunctionality is identified by SDC, UNDP and Mercy Corps mainly in forms of 
individual attitudes, inter-group relationships and faulty institutions. In view of this, the aid agencies 
promote societal and political change, defined in categories such as ‘modern’, ‘traditional’, ‘civil’, 
‘participatory’  and  ‘democratic’.  My research  shows  that these categories are neither obvious nor 
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uncontested. Not only do they refer to vague, reified and idealised constructions, but the concept of 
conflict transformation is defined teleologically by reference to the supposed state of those who 
promote it. Thus, I argue that the frame of reference for the promoted social change becomes the 
supposed state of the societies that the donors are embedded in. Such an idea is explicitly expressed 
by Senghaas (2004) who suggests that ‘the West’, having undergone modernisation, can provide 
solution to those who are still in the process of it. Empirically, it also becomes manifest in the 
example of the CBOs whose social imaginary appears to pursue an idealised version of Western 
political organisation - not to be taken for an actual social practice. In this sense, conflict 
transformation entails a distinct ethnocentric bias. Such a bias becomes all the more problematic 
when coupled with ideas about moral progress towards a more peaceful, more civil and more 
harmonious society which underlie the aid agencies’ approach and on which I will elaborate later. 
In addition, the concept of conflict transformation also entails distinctly evolutionary narratives of 
how societies are expected to develop. Again, this is most clearly expressed by Senghaas (2004), 
who suggests that there is a road to modernity. CBOs stand in this sense for a future model, while 
past ones such as the elders merely serve instrumental or process-oriented purposes. The validity of 
this evolutionary idea has been contested by two insights. First, the inquiry into institutional 
histories of customary institutions in Central Asian societies discloses multiple ‘modernities’ and 
multiple ‘traditions’ that result from several layers of pre-Tsarist and Tsarist social engineering as 
well as Soviet modernisation schemes. Second, it demonstrates that institutions do not simply 
progressively evolve on a presumably pre-defined road to the future. Rather, they are consciously 
altered in their normative repertoire, their scope of validity and their social significance, at times 
appropriated by the state. Benda-Beckmann et al. (2003:297) note for traditionalism that, ‘It usually 
results from present- and future-oriented strategies for (re)asserting collective identities and for 
dealing with competing political and economic claims’. ‘Re-traditionalising’, as it is being done by 
Central Asian states to create a national ideology, or ‘modernising’ institutions, as the aid agencies 
attempt with the substantive societal change through CBOs, are thus quintessentially political 
projects. 
The promotion of civil society in the form of CBOs by the aid agencies entails a distinct vision of how 
the state and the individual should engage with each other. The model of the ‘active citizen’ which 
underlies CBOs, I suggest, is to confront the presumably determined subjects of formerly state 
socialist regimes with new forms of agency, making reference to a ‘valorized “Western” Self’ 
(Junghans 2001, p. 383) that is understood as self-authoring. The state, on the other hand, appears 
usually ‘out there’, and is thus referred to as being outside and ‘above’ local communities. This is 
exemplified by Lederach’s (1997) idealised representation of the state’s constitution, hierarchically 
structured. My empirical findings, however, strongly contests such a view. They show not only that 
the diffuse yet omnipresent nature of the state cannot be relegated to a level or a centre, but they 
similarly demonstrate that the contestation of what a state should be and how it should function 
takes place precisely at the level of the community. Equally, the boundary between those who 
personify the state and those who do not, appears blurred and cannot sharply be distinguished as 
suggested by SDC, UNDP and Mercy Corps. 
These reflections lead to the issue of power. I have suggested that the aid agencies intended to 
evoke a form of ‘power to’ in the form of associational power. At the same time, the aid agencies 
and their projects themselves constitute a form of power that they exert. The analysis of the CBOs 
established by the aid agencies has shown, not surprisingly, that local societal arrangements and 
power relations (e.g., gender relationships) inscribe themselves into the organisation. In this sense, 
existing social relationships are not left ‘at the boundary’ of the new space that CBOs create, but 
continue to exert influence on how such organisations constitute themselves. Yet, the aid agencies 
also create new forms of power relations with CBOs. They shape specific public spaces where 
elections are held and decisions are supposed to be made. Such spaces may provide a forum for 
some, while excluding others. Furthermore, they give importance to particular types of knowledge 
and  expertise  held  by  segments of society. Finally, they shape specific forms of ‘subjectivities’ that 
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they construe for the inclusion into CBOs such as the elderly, the women and ethnic groups. In this 
sense, to some extent CBOs do rewrite the subjectivities of those who participate in the exercise of 
popular agency. 
SDC, UNDP and Mercy Corps locate power to a high degree in human agency. Such agency is 
expected to develop without prior changes in structures and systems, even notwithstanding the 
stark forms of control and by no means conducive conditions. In this view, power thus resides with 
individual members of a community, and can increase with specific forms of sociability and the 
successful pursuit of individual and collective goals. Through this conceptualisation, responsibility for 
non-violent behaviour and relationships is being conceptually relegated to the conflict parties. 
Moreover, within the civilising and modernising ideas that underlie the approach, failure of the 
conflict parties to foreclose further violence is accordingly relegated to lacking moral progress 
towards peace. At least theoretically, such evaluation perpetuates the need for ‘engaging those who 
are not as yet fully committed to peaceful change’ (Mercy Corps 2003:17) into further peace-
building, along the lines of Ferguson’s (1990) influential statement of international aid as an ‘anti-
politics machine’ which grinds on in a self-perpetuating manner. 
However, it would be much too simple to conceive of the aid agencies’ approach as the only nexus 
of power and knowledge that shapes the context. I have suggested (Bichsel 2009) that both the aid 
agencies and Central Asian states rewrite subjectivities of ‘beneficiaries’ and ‘citizens’ through 
projects of modernisation and re-traditionalisation. Furthermore, establishing knowledge about a 
conflict is a field of contestation for which the aid agencies may provide a site for expression; 
however, the processes that shape this contestation are far beyond the reach of the latter. In this 
sense, rather than constituting a regime of domination, I suggest that SDC, UNDP and Mercy Corps 
provide new space for political action and competition. The types of authority that become manifest 
in such competition and the forms of power that they constitute themselves from is often beyond the 
‘local’. Accordingly, enabling or constraining conditions and relations that crucially shape the room 
for manoeuvre for CBOs are not located in their constituencies. This observation questions the 
territorially defined and ‘locally’ understood nature of CBOs, and may also suggest that the idea of 
‘community’ upon which aid agencies base their approach is of an essentialist and romanticised 
nature (see Delanty 2003). Finally, these reflections also question the idea of peace as a potential to 
be tapped locally, as the attempt of tapping ‘positive local traditions and customs’ (Mercy Corps 
2003:19) suggests. 
3.4 Conclusion 
Harmony, the ultimate goal of SDC, UNDP and Mercy Corps, surfaces in many forms. It appears in 
the continuation of a ‘success story’ that describes ‘[…] the sincere well-wishes and goodwill that 
residents of Ravot brought to the opening [of the new drinking water system] to offer to their 
neighbors in Vorukh’ (USAID 2003, no pagination). In this quotation, harmony is presumed in the 
absence of violence and the presence of friendly behaviour shown by the groups. This quotation 
locates harmony mainly in the behavioural realm and does not foreclose unequal relationships and a 
perception of an imposed compromise. Furthermore, a particular form of harmony also appeared in 
Khush’iar, when the Uzbekistani government violently quelled any form of possible unrest related to 
the conflict escalation by control and arms. The superimposed normalcy established resurfaces then 
as a representational fiction of harmony in the Kyrgyzstani and internationally oriented press which 
presented the conflict as resolved. Finally, harmony appears in the speech of the CBO representative 
that I met in the course of the escalation and who argued for moderation and tolerance after the 
outbreak of violence. In the face of other social forces and increased militarisation of the context, his 
elaborations on harmony appear not only forlorn, but become a source of suspicion. I thus conclude 
that the very idea of harmony does not embody the abstract ‘good’, but is itself intertwined with 
forms of power. 
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I suggest that SDC, Mercy Corps and UNDP failed to provide a solution to the conflicts at stake in 
the Ferghana Valley. In my view, this is a consequence of the three aid agencies’ conceptualisation 
of these conflicts as emerging from adversarial relationships over scarce resources between ethnic 
communities and thus resolvable in the very same context. I propose four major points of critique to 
such an approach. 
1. The perspective that conflict is endemic to the local context. 
The first point of critique concerns the perspective that the sources of conflicts addressed are lodged 
in the relationship between communities differing in ethnic affiliation. The approach apprehends 
irrigation conflict as disrupted relations between two or several communities, and thus solvable in 
the very same context. My research demonstrates that such conflicts are not ‘local’ but embedded in 
wider political interests and power constellations. Issues at stake are thus often impervious to a 
‘local’ solution. 
2. The functional understanding of conflict. 
The second point of critique addresses the functional understanding of conflict sources and parties 
that the approach exposes. Conflict is seen to emerge from ‘grievances’ over scarce resources. Such 
‘grievances’ are expected to lead to violent conflict. Moreover, conflict parties are conceptualised as 
homogenous and uniform, shaped by essentialist solidarity that accounts for collective goals in a 
conflict. This research has pointed out the relativity of scarcity, has questioned that primarily 
unsatisfied needs lead to the adoption of violence and has finally deconstructed the monolithic 
representations of ethnic groups. 
3. The assumption of homology between the conflict parties. 
The third point of critique concerns the assumption of homology between conflict parties. The 
donors presume such homology not only between the conflict parties, but also between the CBOs 
and, more abstractly, for the enabling and constraining conditions which conflict mitigation meets in 
the respective countries. My work has pointed out that upstream-downstream configurations in 
irrigation systems are power relations. Furthermore, it has shown that conflict and its mitigation do 
not take place outside power constellations. 
4. The normative nature of proposed social change. 
The fourth point of critique addresses the normative nature of the social change brought forward by 
donors. It maintains that both by portraying irrigation conflicts and by proposing their 
‘transformation’, the approach studied exposes normative accounts of evolution and moral progress. 
The study has brought to light some of these assumptions and suggests that apart from their 
ethnocentric bias, such prescriptions also lead to forms of depoliticisation and disempowerment. 
Expressed in admittedly simplified terms, more water does not equal ‘better’ people, as is presumed. 
Promotion of the aid agencies’ approach is based on the assumption that conditions of equal power 
exist between the two parties. It further assumes that negotiation and mediation take place in a 
vacuum, thus isolated from the local political and economic context, let alone the wider political 
contingencies, power constellations, and elite interests. This may be a consequence of underlying 
assumptions that causes of conflict are to be found in the relationship between communities, and 
that negotiation and mediation take place between equal partners and outside power relations. 
Nader notes that ‘the rhetoric of harmony law models is attractive. But the idea that in a conciliatory 
model people do not fight but rather harmoniously agree about a common solution is fiction. So also 
is the belief that such a harmony model exists in “primitive” and “idyllic” societies. Once again we 
need to understand the real dynamic of power that is at play’. (Nader 2001: 25). 
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